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Abstract
The 1993 U.N. Straddling Stock Agreement prescribes a multi-national or-
ganizational structure for management of an exploited marine Þsh stock, one
whose range straddles both Extended Economic Zones (EEZs) and high seas
waters. However, the Agreement provides to the Regional Organization no co-
ercive enforcement powers. In this connections two problems in particular have
been cited: The Þrst, called the interloper problem, concerns the diﬃculty of
controlling the harvesting by non-member vessels. The second problem, called
the new-member problem, concerns the inherent diﬃculties of negotiating
mutually acceptable terms of entry.
Here we explore the extent to which the coalition, by exerting economic
power alone, might be able attain eﬀective leverage in these management-
control controversies. SpeciÞcally, we will examine whether the coalition might
successfully employ traditional monopolistic entry barriers.
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Game-theoretic economic analysis provides some helpful insights into this
question, but the open-access character of resource exploitation on the high seas
complicates its applicability here. On the other hand, the game is asymmetric,
with the incumbent coalition enjoying certain advantages.
Our analysis lends support to the thesis that usually leverage to enforce
regional management control must be sought elsewhere, other than through
direct application of economic power within the harvesting sector.
1. INTRODUCTION1
The 1993 U.N. Straddling Stock Agreement prescribes a multi-national organiza-
tional structure for the management of exploited high seas straddling Þsh stocks
those whose range is partly in international waters, but typically overlaps certain
coastal states Extended Economic Zones. The Agreement speciÞes that harvesting,
wherever within the biological range it occurs, should be coordinated by a coalition of
the traditional harvesting states, acting through a U.N. sanctioned Regional Fisheries
Management Organization (RFMO). While simultaneously recognizing the right of
all states to utilize the biological resources of the high seas, the agreement calls for
those nations who wish to participate in harvest of the straddling stock, but are not
currently members of the RFMO, to declare a willingness to join and to enter into
negotiations over mutually acceptable terms of entry.
However, the agreement provides to the RFMO no coercive enforcement powers,
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either to exclude non-member harvest nor to set the terms of entry into membership.
This lack of enforcement power has caused many to doubt the eﬀectiveness of the
proposed regional management mechanism. Two inter-related problems in particular
have been cited:
The Þrst, called by Gordon Munro (1999) the interloper problem, concerns the
diﬃculty of controlling the harvesting by non-member vessels. These include individu-
ally operated vessels (perhaps ßying ßags-of-convenience) but also include coordinated
multi-vessel distant water ßeets (DWFs) seeking targets-of-opportunity, intent on
skimming oﬀ a bountiful harvest wherever it occurs, but with little interest in the
long-term conservation of the stocks.
The second problem identiÞed by Kaitala and Munro (1993), as the new member
problem, concerns the inherent diﬃculties of negotiating, in a timely manner, mutu-
ally acceptable terms of entry, which will specify the petitioning nations membership
rights and obligations.
These two separate problems merge when a DWF, previously not heavily engaged in
a particular straddling stock Þshery, appears on the scene and declares an interest in
joining an already well-established RFMO. In this situation the interests of the current
members and the applicant are strongly opposed, with current members facing the
likelihood of having to give up a portion of their present quotas to the prospective new
member, and the applicant believing that it might be advantageous to remain outside
of the coalition, continuing to harvest proÞtably while demonstrating its strategic
strengths for future negotiations.
This is the second of two studies, in which we address these inter-related problems.
In the Þrst (McKelvey, et. al., 2002) we examine strategic aspects of a confrontation
between a RFMO and a DWF, in a situation where the entire stock is susceptible to
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DWF high seas harvest. In this case a RFMO, lacking statutory enforcement powers,
has little ability through harvest policy alone to mount an eﬀective defense against
DWF pulse Þshing, and its consequent economic disruption and stock degradation.
Here we examine a straddling stock Þshery, when the Þsh stock range includes a high
seas component, but a substantial portion of the stock remains within the exclusive
EEZs of the RFMO members, where it is protected against harvest by any DWF
ßeet. This is a common situation for many major Þsh stocks worldwide (Meltzer,
1994). The typical behavior of the RFMO states is to conÞne their harvest to home
waters, essentially abandoning the high seas portion of the stock range to the DWFs.
In this case, the home ßeets can respond to the presence of the high seas DWF by
harvesting more intensively on home ground, lowering seasonal escapement and hence
the subsequent Þshing seasons recruitment, and so lowering the likelihood of future
entry of the DWF.
But a still more active RFMO strategy might also be contemplated. In an eﬀort
to deter the current-season entry of any potential distant-water invader, the regional
ßeet might move preemptively into international waters, to Þsh-down the migratory
portion of stock. The eﬀect of this high seas overharvest could then be mitigated by
a compensating reduction in the scale of the subsequent harvest in the EEZs.
The possibility of success of such aggressive RFMO strategies rests on the assumed
likelihood that a DWF will face higher Þxed costs of high seas entry than will the
regional ßeet. Not only are there the transportation costs of moving a DWF ßeet to
a distant Þshing ground and maintaining it there, but there are also opportunity costs
of doing so: A DWF ßeet, displaced from its more traditional harvest grounds and
seeking out targets-of-opportunity on the high seas, will have several options to choose
from, and will enter this particular Þshery only if the reward for doing so exceeds the
potential return from harvesting elsewhere. Aggressive high seas harvesting by the
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RFMO may tip the balance decisively against DWF entry.
In this study we undertake to determine the optimal harvest policy for the RFMO
β-ßeet, given that it is undertaking total α-ßeet (DWF) exclusion. Such a policy
may often be expensive to implement but might be justiÞed as avoiding potentially
far more costly damage to the stocks from the distant-water harvesting and also as
a means of establishing a reputation for aggressiveness in any future confrontations.
It is most likely to prove eﬀective when the distant-water ßeet faces high entry costs
and/or the migratory fraction of the Þsh-stock is small.
The existing game-theoretic analysis of industrial organization, (e.g. Tirole, 1988),
provides some helpful insights into economic entry barriers, but its applicability here
is complicated by the open-access character of resource exploitation in a high seas
Þshery. This derives from the fact that all harvesters are exploiting a common
biological stock pool. As we shall see, this common-property externality reduces the
eﬀectiveness of any potential economic barrier which operates exclusively within the
Þshery sector.
2. THE BASIC FISHERY MODEL
We shall consider the case of a single harvested Þsh stock with non-overlapping
generations, a stock which spawns in nursery grounds that lie entirely within the
EEZs of the RFMO countries. Following dispersal, the young eventually mature
to a harvestable stock biomass R, called the recruitment to the Þshery. This
recruitment divides into two parts. One fraction Rθ = θR will migrate beyond the
territorial waters, into adjacent areas of the high seas, where it potentially is subject
to harvest by both a distant-water α-ßeet and the RFMO β-ßeet. The remaining
fraction
Rφ = φR , (1− θ)R
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remains within the territorial EEZs. We assume that high seas harvest occurs Þrst,
ahead of harvest within the EEZs, and that thereby the high seas stock is reduced to
a high seas escapement Sθ. . This residual high seas stock then returns to the EEZs
where it merges with the unharvested resident substock Rφ to form a Þnal seasonal
harvestable stock
Rβ = Rφ + Sθ,
accessible only to the regional ßeet. A home-waters harvest, by the regional ßeet,
now reduces Rβ to the end-of-season escapement biomass Sβ, which returns to the
nursery ground to spawn and die.
The oﬀspring generation from the spawn then matures to form, at the beginning
of a new harvest season, a new recruitment level R+. The cycle then repeats. The
oﬀspring recruitment R+ is determined from its parental biomass Sβ by the (deter-
ministic) stock-recruitment equation.
R+ = F (Sβ).
Here F (Sβ) is monotone increasing and concave, with
F (0) = 0
and a single positive Þxed point K (the carrying capacity), where
F (K) = K.
Schematically,
(hα + hβθ)
Rθ = θR −→ Sθ
% & (hβφ)
R −→ Rφ = φR −→ −→ −→ Rβ −→ Sβ −→ R+ = F (Sβ)
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2.1 Centrally-Managed Harvesting: A Baseline Model.
As a baseline to consideration of this competitive harvest, Þrst assume RFMO
central management of the Þshery, where there is no threat of entry by an outside
DWF. Thus all harvesting, hβφ in EEZs and hθ = hβθ on the high seas, is conducted
exclusively by the RFMO ßeet.
The β-ßeets annual payoﬀ from its harvests, on high-seas and in home waters, will
be
Πβ =
Z θR
Sθ
πθ(x)dx+
Z Rβ
Sβ
πβ(y)dy.
Here, πθ and πβ may be any monotone increasing functions. A frequent choice is
πθ(x) = p− cθ/x and πβ(y) = p− cβ/y.
The home ßeets objective is to choose its harvest policy to maximize the discounted
sum of future annual returns. ∞X
t=0
γtΠβ(t),
with given discount factor γ < 1. We shall make the simplifying assumption (quite
often bourn out) that home-ground harvest costs are lower than those on the high
seas (for example, cβ < cθ). This implies that when there is no threat of invasion the
home ßeet will harvest exclusively in home waters. In fact, for any assumed total
annual harvest, seasonal value Πβ(t) will be greatest when all harvest is postponed
until the high seas stock has returned to the EEZs.
The cyclic generational pattern now simpliÞes to:
Rθ
% & hβφ
R −→ Rφ −→ R −→ Sβ = R − hβφ −→ R+ = F (Sβ).
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It follows from standard harvesting theory [e.g. Clark, 1990] that a centrally man-
aged ßeet, when harvesting monopolistically on home ground and maximizing the
objective function
∞X
t=0
γt
Z R(t)
Sβ(t)
πβ(y)dy,
will set a harvest policy of Þshing-down to a Þxed target escapement S∗β :
Sβ(t) =
 S∗β if S∗β ≤ R(t)R(t) otherwise.
The target S∗β will be chosen optimally according to the usual marginal rule that
πβ(S
∗
β) = πβ(R
∗) · γF 0(S∗β),
with
R∗ = F (S∗β).
We shall assume that S0β < S
∗
β < K, where S
0
β is the bionomic stock level at which
πβ(S
0
β) = 0. Hence the triple
(S∗θ = θR
∗, S∗β , R
∗)
deÞnes a steady-state pattern, with
S0β < S
∗
β < R
∗ < K,
and the cycle
R∗ −→ S∗β −→ R∗ = F (S∗β)
repeating endlessly.
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3. COMPETITIVE HARVEST
Next we return to consideration of a harvesting confrontation, between a distant-
water α-ßeet (DWF) and the combined β-ßeet of the RFMO countries. As described
above, the β-ßeet can harvest in its combined territorial waters (its EEZs) but also on
the high seas. The distant water α-ßeets harvest is conÞned to the high-seas region.
For simplicity we assume that, in a season when both ßeets undertake a high seas
harvest, the β-ßeets high seas harvest will precede the harvest by the distant-water α-
ßeet. Other assumptions would yield similar results. If the β-ßeet does enter, it will
harvest a biomass hθβ ≥ 0, reducing the high seas recruitment Rθ to an escapement
Sθβ = Rθ − hθβ
A subsequent α-ßeet harvest hα ≥ 0 drops the high seas escapement still further, to
Sθ = Sθβ − hα = Rθ − (hθβ + hα).
The cyclic generational pattern is thus elaborated to
(hθβ) (hα)
Rθ −→ Sθβ −→ Sθ
% & (hφβ)
R −→ Rφ −→ −→ −→ −→ −→ Rβ −→ Sβ −→ R+ = F (Sβ)
Unlike the home-based β-ßeet, the distant-water α-ßeet can be expected to experi-
ence a signiÞcant Þxed cost of entry, both in transportation costs in moving the ßeet
and in opportunity costs of passing over alternative harvesting opportunities. Accord-
ingly we assume that the α-ßeets policy is to enter the high seas Þshery only if Sθβ
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exceeds a critical threshold level Rα, which may lie well above its target escapement
level (compare McKelvey et al., 2002).
In this study we undertake to determine the optimal harvest policy for the RFMO
β-ßeet, given that it is undertaking total α-ßeet exclusion. We assume that indeed
the β-ßeet has the eﬀort capacity necessary to exclude α-ßeet entry completely, thus
Sθ = Sθβ ≤ Rα,
though such exclusionmay come only at high cost. The rationale for, and implications
of, this assumption will be explored in the concluding section of the article.
The optimal β-ßeet policy for achieving α-exclusion in any particular season de-
pends, Þrst of all, on the initial recruitment R at the beginning of that season. Be-
cause of our continuing assumption, of lower β-ßeet harvesting costs in home waters
than on high seas, therefore optimally, Sθβ ≤ Rα should be achieved with minimal
high-seas β-ßeet harvest. Thus, in any harvest season with initial recruitment R, the
high seas β-ßeet escapement must be
Sθ = Sθβ = min[θR,Rα].
That is, β-ßeet high seas harvest occurs only when necessary to bring the high seas
stock down to the α-ßeets entry threshold. Otherwise β-ßeet harvesting is conÞned
to its home waters. Equivalently, in any harvest season Sθ is determined by the size
of recruitment R relative to a critical recruitment level
Rcrit , Rα/θ.
SpeciÞcally,
Sθ = Sθβ =
 Rα, if Rcrit ≤ R;θR, if R ≤ Rcrit.
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3.1 Feasible Escapements and Feasible Steady-States
While Sθ is completely determined in this way, the corresponding home-waters
escapement level Sβ is only constrained, by the obvious feasibility constraint that
home waters escapement cannot exceed home waters Þnal recruitment Rβ. Thus, for
given recruitment R,
Sβ ≤ Rβ = Sθ +Rφ = min[R,Rα + φR] = min[R, θRcrit + φR].
More explicitly,
Sβ ≤ Rα + φR if Rcrit ≤ R;
or
Sβ ≤ R if R ≤ Rcrit.
In particular, in order for a given escapement bSβ ≤ K to generate a feasible steady-
state cycle bR , F (bSβ) −→ bSβ −→ bR,
the above feasibility constraint becomes that
bSβ ≤ min[F (bSβ), Rα + φF (bSβ)].
Note that, if bR ≤ Rcrit, the steady-state feasibility requirement says only thatbSβ ≤ bR = F (bSβ), and this follows automatically from the assumption (bSβ ≤ K) thatbSβ generates a steady state.
In the opposite case where
Rcrit < bR < K,
the steady-state feasibility constraint
bSβ ≤ Rα + φ bR
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may be written as
F−1( bR) ≤ Rα + φ bR
or as
Rα ≥ G( bR,φ) , F (−1)( bR)− φ bR.
In Þgure 1, the convex graph of bSβ = F (−1)( bR) and the straight line graphs of bR
and φ bR are plotted against bR ∈ [0,K], for Þxed values of the parameters (Rα, θ).
For any choice of steady-state recruitment bR ≤ K, the total harvest is the vertical
interval from the graph of bR down to the escapement bSβ , with the high-seas portion
of the harvest lying above the boldface graph of bRβ = min[ bR,Rα + φ bR].
The Þgure shows too that there is a steady-state recruitment level Ro ≥ 0 such
that for any bR ≤ Ro the graph of bSβ lies below that of φ bR. Thus for bR < Ro the
initial home-ground recruitment φ bR alone is adequate to assure that the steady-state
feasibility constraint will be met. But for bR on the interval (Ro,K), the graph of bSβ
is above that of φ bR, so that satisfying steady-state feasibility will require also some
high-seas harvest. Note that on that interval, the vertical separation G( bR,φ) between
these two graphs is monotone-increasing in bR, taking on all positive values between
0 at Ro and θK at R = K .
Hence there is a unique feasible steady-state recruitment level bR = eR(Rcrit,φ) ∈
[Ro,K) for which
G( eR,φ) = Rα.
This is precisely the recruitment level eR > Rcrit where the steady-state feasibility
constraint binds. Consequently this particular recruitment generates the feasible
steady-state conÞguration
bSθ = θ eR, bSβ = eSβ = F−1( eR), bR = eR
which entails only a high seas harvest.
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As Þgure 1 illustrates, each recruitment level bR on the interval
0 < bR ≤ eR
meets the steady-state feasibility requirement, with the high-seas harvest pinching
out at bR = Rcrit. But no steady-state recruitment level bR on
eR < bR ≤ K
is feasible, since there Rα < G( bR,φ).
3.2 Optimal defensive management by the β-fleet.
We turn now to an examination of which, among the feasible steady-states, will in
fact be optimal as a target, for maximizing the β-ßeets discounted-sum payoﬀ while
deterring the entry of the α-ßeet. The answer will depend on the particular values
of the parameter pair (Rα, θ)
We shall focus on the situation of a RFMOs β-ßeet which, up to the present time,
had been harvesting optimally at steady-state S∗β without external challenge. But, we
assume, from this time onward it is faced with a constant threat of entry by a distant-
water α-ßeet, with entry threshold Rα. Thus to exclude α-ßeet entry the β-ßeet
must initially harvest-down the high seas recruitment θR to Rα, then follow up by an
optimal sequence of subsequent home waters and high seas harvests, always keeping
Sβθ ≤ Rα. The way in which this is accomplished depends on the relative size of the
entry-threshold level Rα of the α-ßeet, as compared to the high-seas recruitment θR∗
which prevails when the β-ßeet harvests optimally as an unchallenged sole-operator.
The resolution is particularly easy when the challenging ßeet has an especially high
entry threshold: i.e. when Rα ≥ θR∗. Recalling that, by assumption, R∗ < K, this
implies that S∗β ≤ R∗ ≤ Rcrit. In this case the incumbent ßeet need only modify its
13
sole-operator optimal policy mildly, by setting
Sθ = min[Rα, θR],
in order to deter α-ßeet entry. Note that, for initial R ≥ S∗β , one has
Rβ = min[θR
crit + φR,R] ≥ S∗β ,
while if initial R ≤ S∗β then
Rβ = R.
Hence set
Sβ = min[Rβ , S
∗
β] =
 S∗β if Rβ ≥ S∗βR if Rβ ≤ S∗β
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ .
Thus this modiÞed sole-operator policy continues to lead to yield a trajectory of
most-rapid-approach to the optimal sole-operator steady-state, while simultaneously
deterring α-ßeet entry.
Thus, in what follows, we can concentrate on the situation where
Rα < θR
∗.
with entry threshold low relative to the unchallenged home ßeets steady-state re-
cruitment.
3.3 Determining Admissible Steady-States
In general the β-ßeets optimal competitive harvest escapement Sβ, given the entry
threshold Rα of the α-ßeet and the current recruitment R, is determined by solving
a dynamic programming equation. Let V [R] denote the optimal (discounted sum)
payoﬀ to the β-ßeet Assuming a positive harvest in the initial year, so thatR > Sβ.the
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dynamic programming equation (DPE) is
V [R] =

R θR
Rα
πθ(s)ds+ max
Sβ≤Rα+φR
nR Rα+φR
Sβ
πβ(s)ds+ γV [F (Sβ)]
o
if Rcrit < R;
max
Sβ≤R
nR R
Sβ
πβ(s)ds+ γV [F (Sβ)]
o
if R ≤ Rcrit.
.
Note that the permissible range of Sβ is determined by the feasibility constraint, that
home-waters escapement Sβ cannot exceed terminal home-waters recruitment Rβ . In
particular, if R ≤ K, then the corresponding steady-state escapement Sβ = F−1(R)
lies within the feasible range.
Our goal is to determine the feasible escapement
Sβ = Sβ(R;Rα, θ)
which maximizes V [R] for large R. In this section we narrow down the candidate set
of escapements to those which provide local extrema of V [R] , within the permissible
range of feasibility. To Þnd an interior extremum, one diﬀerentiates the bracketed
expression in the DPE by Sβ. Each locally-optimal escapement necessarily must
satisfy
∂Sβ{} = −πβ(Sβ) + γF 0(Sβ) λ[F (Sβ)] ≥ 0,
with the inequality possible only when the feasibility constraint binds. Here
λ(R) , d
dR
V (R). =
 πmix(R,Rα, θ) if R > Rcrit;πβ(R) if R ≤ Rcrit. .
where
πmix(R,Rα, θ) , θπθ(θR) + φπβ(Rα + φR).
In particular when the feasibility constraint
Sβ ≤ min[R,Rα + φR]
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does not bind, which is so if R is suﬃciently large, then Sβ generates a feasible
steady-state which satisÞes
πβ(Sβ) = γF
0(Sβ)
 πmix[F (Sβ), Rα, θ] if F (Sβ) ≥ Rcrit;πβ[F (Sβ)] if F (Sβ) ≤ Rcrit. .
independent of large R.
As discussed previously, the global solution to the equation
πβ(bSβ) = γF 0(bSβ)πβ[F (bSβ)]
is bSβ = S∗β.
However the equation
πβ(S
#
β ) = γF
0(S#β )πmix[F (S
#
β ), Rα, θ]
for a given parameter pair (Rα, θ), may have one or more formal solutions, or none
at all. Any formal solution interior to the interval
Scritβ ≤ S#β ≤ eSβ,
with F (Scritβ ) = R
crit, generates a steady-state with β-ßeet harvest both on high-seas
and in home-waters. A solution coinciding with an endpoint of this interval generates
a steady-state with harvest at just one of these sites. On the other hand, S#β lying
outside of this interval either fails to be feasible (when eSβ < S#β ) or is not locally
optimal (when S#β < S
crit
β ).
The deÞning equation for S#β represents a new marginal rule, analogous to that
which is satisÞed by S∗. It equates the immediate return, from harvest of the marginal
unit of the Þsh stock at the two sites, to its potential value from maintaining it in the
brood stock to enhance subsequent recruitment.
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Along with S∗β, the steady-state escapements S
crit
β ,
eSβ, and S#β ∈ [Scritβ , eSβ] will
be termed admissible steady-state escapements: the true optimal escapement for
Rα > θR will necessarily take on one of these values. Of course if Rα ≥ θR∗ (i.e. if
Rcrit ≥ R∗ ), then S∗β already has been established to be the optimum escapement.
Thus it remains to determine the global optimum when Rα < θR∗ (i.e. when
Rcrit < R∗).
3.4 Determining the optimal admissable steady-state.
The discounted-sum payoﬀ, starting from a suﬃciently large Þxed initial recruit-
ment R and resolving directly into a pattern of steady-state harvests on both high
seas and home waters, is
W [R,Sβ ] =
Z θR
Rα
πθ +
Z Rα+φR
Sβ
πβ +
γ
1− γ
"Z θF [Sβ ]
Rα
πθ +
Z Rα+φF [Sβ]
Sβ
πβ
#
.
This pattern is feasible for any Sβ such that Scrit < Sβ < eSβ, and in particular
for any S#β ∈ [Scrit, eSβ]. However the formal expression which deÞnes the payoﬀ is
meaningful as a mathematical expression for any Sβ ≤ K, even though, outside of the
region of feasibility, the corresponding triple [F (Sβ), Rα, Sβ] will no longer represent
an attainable harvesting pattern.
Diﬀerentiating W by Sβ, one Þnds
(1− γ)W 0(Sβ) , (1− γ)∂SβW [R, Sβ; ] = −πβ(Sβ) + γF 0(Sβ)·πmix[F (Sβ), Rα, θ],
independent of R.
Note that, for Þxed [Rα, θ], one has by the deÞnition of S
#
β , that W
0(S#β ) = 0 for
any and all values of this multi-valued function, but at no other values of Sβ . Note
also that, when Sβ = K, one has
(1− γ)W 0(K) = −πβ(K) + γF 0(K)·πmix[K,Rα, θ] < −πβ(K)[1− γF 0(K)] < 0.
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This result can aid in determining which of the zeroes of the multi-valued function
S#β are maxima and which are minima. Thus if, for a given [Rα, θ], this function has
only simple zeroes, then W (Sβ) has a local maximum at the upper branch of S
#
β and
alternating local minimum and maxima at subsequent branch.
4. SYNTHESIS OF RESULTS: AN ILLUSTRATION
Our analysis has revealed that, whenever the incumbent β-ßeet is able to exclude
entry of the potential invader α-ßeet, the optimal β-policy is most-rapid approach to
a stable steady-state which is determined by the parameter pair (Rα, θ) as follows:
A) If Rcrit = Rα/θ ≥ R∗, then the monopolistic policy
Sθ = min[Rα, θR]; and
Sβ = min[S
∗
β , R]
is optimal, and leads to the stable steady state {S∗θ , S∗β, R∗}, with R∗ = F (S∗β) and
S∗θ = θR
∗. By assumption, R∗ < K, so that this policy is always optimal when
Rcrit ≥ K, i.e. when the α-ßeet entry threshold is high relative to the high-seas
migratory fraction of the stock.
B) Hereafter consider that, for given (Rα, θ),
Rcrit(Rα, θ) < R
∗ < K.
The globally-optimal steady state will be determined by a steady-state recruitmentbR on the interval
Rcrit ≤ bR ≤ eR,
and will occur at one of the local optima of R# lying within this closed interval or
at one of the endpoints, should it be a (constrained) local maximum. The outcome
is unambiguous when there is only one local maximum in the interval. If there are
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more, then the outcome may depend on the value of the initial recruitment R(0) at
time t = 0.
There are a number of possibilities, depending on the multiplicity of the multiple-
valued function R#(Rα, θ). We illustrate by considering the cases that arise in Þg. 2
and, and in the panels shown in Þgure 3. Figure 2 shows the value function,W , against
R, and the possibilities that arise below the graph. Figure 3 shows S∗, S#, Scrit andeS against Rα for a given θ.
A typical situation is that shown in Þgure 3 (lower right), where the curve deÞning
R#(Rα, θ), regarded as a function of Rα for Þxed θ, has no solution for small Rα,
is double valued for suﬃciently large Rα,and single valued at the boundary between
these two intervals of Rα. Furthermore, these formal solution values need not lie
within the interval of feasibility Rcrit ≤ R# ≤ eR, see Þgure 2 also. Where there are
two, and both are feasible, it turns out that the higher one R
#
is a maximum and the
lower R# a minimum, as shown by the following argument.
B1) Consider that, for given (Rα, θ), the multi-valued function R#(Rα, θ) is empty
so that W 0(bS) is never zero, and hence remains negative for all bS ∈ [Scrit, eS]. Thus
the maximum of W (bS) on that interval occurs at
bS = Scrit,
and the optimal policy is most-rapid approach to the stable steady state
bSθ = Rα, bSβ = Scritβ = F (−1)(Rcrit), bR = Rcrit
deÞned by bR = Rcrit
Thus for any seasonal recruitment R,
Sθ = min[Rα, θR]; and
Sβ = min[S
crit
β , R].
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This can be seen in all four panels of Þgure 3.
B2) Consider now that the function R#(Rα, θ) is double-valued, with R# < R
#
,
and that.W 0(bS) has simple zeroes at S# and S#. Then, since W 0(K) < 0, it follows
thatW (bS) has a global maximum at S# and a global minimum at S#. Again there are
several possibilities. In fact, there are six possibilities altogether as can be recognized
from Þgure 2.
Case I : If
R# < Rcrit < R
#
< eR,
then R = R
#
is a local maximum and both R = Rcrit and R = eR are local minima of
W on the closed interval [Rcrit, eR] Hence the two-region harvest policy determined
by bR = R#
is optimal, with
bSθ = Rα, bSβ = Scritβ = F (−1)(Rcrit), bR = Rcrit
Rcrit(Rα, θ) ≤ R#(Rα, θ),
and
Sθ = min[Rα, θR
#(Rα, θ)];
Sβ = min[S
#
θ (Rα, θ), Rα + φR
#(Rα, θ)]
Case II Suppose
R# < R
#
< Rcrit < eR
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or
Rcrit < eR < R# < R#.
then, throughout the interval [Rcrit, eR], one has W 0(eS) < 0. Hence, as in case B1,
the policy determined by bR = Rcrit
is optimal. Thus there is only a home-waters harvest at steady state.
On the other hand, if .
R# < Rcrit < eR < R#
then, throughout the interval [Rcrit, eR], one has W 0(bS) > 0. Hence the policy deter-
mined by bR = eR
is optimal. Thus there is only a high seas harvest at steady state.
Finally
Case III Here the optimal policy is ambiguous, and may depend not only on
(Rα, θ) but also on the initial recruitment R(0).
In the Þrst subcase, where
Rcrit < R# < R
#
< eR
then
both bR = R# and bR = Rcrit
provide local maxima of W 0(bSβ), and hence each remains a candidate for optimal
steady-state recruitment. (However at the parameter value (Rα, θ) where the two
branches join (so R# = R
#
), then W 0(bSβ) ≤ 0 throughout [Rcrit, eR] so that bR =
Rcrit.)
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In the second subcase, where
Rcrit < R# < eR < R#
then again there are two local maxima of W 0(bSβ) within [Rcrit, eR], so
either bR = eR or bR = Rcrit.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The above analysis is highly idealized, but perhaps suggestive. It shows that, in
principle, an aggressive harvesting policy by an incumbent ßeet could deter entry by
a distant-water ßeet, by deliberately drawing down the high-seas stock. It also shows
that, depending on the relative strategic strengths of the ßeets, this might sometimes
be achieved by relatively modest deviations from unchallenged monopolistic policies.
The analysis could be elaborated to incorporate greater realism. (For example, a more
realistic model formulation would make Rα stochastic, and only partially predictable
by the β-ßeet. In that circumstance, the task before the β-ßeet would become to
develop a harvest policy which would achieve a balance between ongoing costs of
deterrence and the occasional severe disruption of the Þshery by interloper ßeets.)
However the analysis does demonstrate that the strategies explored here are rather
desperate: The economic and ecological losses they entail might be acceptable on a
few occasions (to prevent a catastrophic stock draw-down by a one-time potential
invader), but an on-going policy of preemptory high-seas stock draw-down could be a
very expensive form of insurance against an ongoing threat. Furthermore, it carries its
own risks, since Þshery stock-assessment is an uncertain science, and mis-calculations
(especially leading to over-harvesting) could be quite damaging.
The strategic position of an incumbent β-ßeet attempting such a policy could be
very weak. Indeed, if the DWFs threshold entry level is below the β-ßeets high-
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seas break-even level, then exclusion is possible only by harvesting at a loss. Even
when high-seas harvesting is proÞtable, it will be less so than continuing to harvest
exclusively at home. And even if exclusion is possible without a high-seas β-harvest,
the home-waters target escapements necessary to achieve exclusion will be below the
level that would be most proÞtable for an unchallenged monopolist. As we have
seen, for such low levels of the DWFs entry barrier, the home-ßeets policy may be
discontinuous, implying sudden drops in the escapement. The picture is somewhat
brighter when the distant-water ßeets entrance threshold is high, and/or the fraction
of recruitment that is accessible to the invading α-ßeet is small.
Still, variants in the strategy might mitigate the costs and risks. The home ßeet
might develop an ability to respond quickly and aggressively, only to each actual in-
vasion. The game would then become one of bluﬀ: If the regional coalition could
develop a credible reputation for aggressive response, it might well frighten oﬀ po-
tential interlopers. Even such a more ßexible policy would have its costs: Not only
would it require the maintenance of an expensive response capability, but its imple-
mentation would require undertaking occasional substantial stock draw-downs, that
might be highly detrimental to future stock productivity. And, once again, miscal-
culations would be likely and could be very expensive. Thus there would remain an
incentive to develop a more eﬀective means of deterrence, or to work out a cooperative
solution.
In conclusion, static and dynamic analysis both predict that barriers to entry into
a regionally managed straddling-stock Þshery can indeed be constructed within the
harvesting sector, but that the erection of such barriers can often have substantial
negative consequences, both for biological sustainability and economic eﬃciency. An
established Regional Management Organization does possess certain strategic ad-
vantages which it can exploit in order to internalize competition. These include
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the Þrst-mover advantage of incumbency and exclusive harvesting rights within the
home-countries EEZs. But normally these advantages can be invoked only at high
cost.
The analysis thus lends support to the thesis that the leverage needed to enforce
regional management control must be sought elsewhere, other than through the direct
application of economic power within the harvesting sector alone.
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Figure 1. 
Each recruitment level R on the interval RR ~0 <<  meets the steady-state feasibility 
requirement, with the high-seas harvest pinching out below R = Rcrit. No steady-state 
recruitment level R on KRR <<~  is feasible, since there RRFR Φ−< − )()1(α . Panel b shows 
the case  when R0 = 0. The area above the thick line and the S-curve, but below the 45o-line, 
is the high seas harvest. (In this figure we have skipped the hats on the steady-state values of 
R and S  .) 
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Figure 2. 
This figure summarizes the possibilities under case B2. The solid horisontal lines indicate the 
positions of Rcrit  and R~  relative to R#  and R #. Rcrit is indicated by Rc and R~  is indicated by 
R~. The rightmost column under the graph indicates the optimal policies with respect to Rˆ  in 
each of the six cases. 
. 
Figure 3
The horizontal line is . Note that  is a multivalued function. Typically no value for small  and two for 
high . The upper branch of  represents a local maximum and the lower a local minimum. Only the part of 
 between  (exclusive high sea harvesting) and  represents admissible solutions for the mixed harvesting. 
The optimal solutions are given by the thick curve. The panel is produced by the standard model given by 
,  and . The discounting factor  and the 
panels are produced with  from upper left to lower right. Scale is relative to the 
Carrying Capasity (K).
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